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4 INTRODUCilON 
1.  The objective of  the present Working Paper 
In the first report on Harmonisation requirements for the internal electricity market
1
, 
the Commission concluded that: 
"As already outlined clearly in the White Paper on renewable energies2, a clear need 
for  common  rules  in  this  area  can  already  be  identified  The  contemporaneous 
existence of  different support schemes appears likely to result in distortions of  trade 
and competition.  The role ofrenewables in the EUwill clearly increase in the coming 
years,  given  the  Kyoto  commitments.  Thus,  potential  market  distortions  will 
accordingly increase.  Whilst the trade and competition distorting effects of  di.fforent 
renewable support schemes is rather limited at present, given the limited EU market 
share of  electricity from  renewable  sources,  this  negative  effect appears  likely to 
significantly increase in· the  coming years.  In  this light,  it is appropriate to  move 
towards the defi'!ition of  some common rules in this area as rapidly as practicable". 
However, before doing so, the Report concludes, it is necessary to gather and analyse 
a further detailed range of information,  notably in order to determine the relative 
merits and disadvantages of the different approaches to renewables  support in the 
different Mem~r  States. 
The  objectives  pursued  by  this  Working  Paper  are  to  report  the  findings  of the 
Commission following the investigations undertaken subsequent to the adoption of 
the abov~-mentioned  report, and to suggest some possible conclusions and options for 
action as a consequence of these fmdings.  It is envisaged that on the basis of the 
comments received following the adoption of this report, notably from  the Council 
and Parliament, the Commission will detennine which subsequent measures, if any, 
should then be proposed. 
It is important to underline that the Commission bas  at this stage reached no  final 
~onclusions on whether harmonisation measures at the Community level should be 
proposed, or their detailed content if they were to be proposed. Whilst this working 
paper does point out a number of possible options that merit careful consideration, a 
final  decision on all these issues will  be  taken in the light of the reactions to this 
document. 
The annexes to this working paper contain information on the share of  Res electricity 
in the Member States, prices  paid for this electricity, support for R&D and details on 
the scope and contents of  the investigations undertaken by the Commission as well as 
on the consultations of  interested parties. 
1 Commission report to the Council and the European Parliament on Harmonization requirements. 
Directive 96/92 concerning rules for the internal market in Electricity. COM( 1998) 167, 16.03.1998 
2 Energy for the future: renewable sources of  energy. White paper for a Community strategy and action 
plan, COM(97)599 final, 26.11.1997 
5 Finally, details on the different support schemes applied in the various Member States 
will be outlined in a forthcoming Commission Staff Working Paper 
2.  Renewable sources of energy and EU energy policy 
2.1.  Promotion of  renewable sources of  energy is a Community priority 
The main priorities ofEU energy policy are: 
•  security of  energy supplies, 
•  competitiveness, and 
•  environmental protection. 
The promotion of  renewables, aimed at increasing their share in the fuel mix, notably 
by ensuring efficient and appropriate support schemes, thus driving down costs, is 
compatible with all these· policy objectives. 
The main reasons why renewable energy sources need to be developed are linked to: 
the environment:  The  environmental  advantages  of renewable  energy  sources 
(RES)  are  undisputed.  Renewable  energy  sources  emit  no,  or reduce  drastically, 
harmful gaseous emissions such as C02, NOx and SOx. C02 is considered to be the 
main contributor to the greenhouse effect and in part causes global climate change. 
~~~are~~~~·~~~~~~~~ 
widely  documented.  RES  are  either carbon  free  fuels,  or are  carbon  neutral,  like 
biomass.  The  Kyoto  protocol  obliges  the  European  Union  Member States,  either 
individually or jointly, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 8% of  their 1990 levels 
in  the  commitment  period  2008  to  2012.  RES  therefore  constitute  an  important 
element of the package of measures needed if the European Union is to reach the 
commitment it has made in ratifying the Kyoto protocol. A significant increase in the 
share of renewables in the EU'  s primary energy consumption is also an important 
element of the integration of environment and in particular climate change into EU 
energy policy as called for by the European Council in Cardiff  and Vienna. 
Competitiveness of  the EU RES-sector: a policy of increasing the share of  RES will 
give an impetus to the European RES-industry. It will make a significant contribution 
towards reaching the critical mass necessary to finance increasing R&D in this sector 
in the  EU.  Exports of machinery  and  technology will  contribute  positively  to the 
European Union's trade balance. 
security and diversity of  supply:  RES,  being  indigenous  sources  of  energy, 
increase the security of  energy supply within the European Union, which is becoming 
ever more dependent on the import of fossil fuels. They also increase the diversity in 
the fuel mix. 
social and economic cohesion: 
•  RES  have considerable advantages for isolated regions which are not sufficiently 
or are not at all connected to the grid, 
6 •  use of RES-electricity ("RES-E") in small isolated systems can help to avoid or 
delay expensive extensions to the grid, 
•  some RES  are a labour intensive form  of industry and create jobs especially at 
location  sites,  in  rural  areas.  This  is  especially  the  case  for  biomass.  The 
Employment guidelines  1999 recommend to Member States to  promote the job 
potential within the area of  environmental technologies. 
In the  light of this, and the Commission's continuing analysis in this sector, future 
Community support schemes with respect to  regional  development will  be  able  to 
become more effective and focused in the coming reference period of2000-2006. 
2.2.  Historical development and projected growth in the EU 
The only renewable source of energy to  have been exploited on a significant scale 
before  1990  has  been  hydro,  usually  large  hydro.  Since  then  growth  has  been 
significant for all new nmewables, between 15-30% per year due to various support 
measures of governments and the ·community. However, the overall contribution to 
the EU electricity market still remains small, around 3% when excluding large hydro. 
The specific development in installed capacity in the wind power sector can be seen 
~he annex I. 
The  development  of electricity  generated  from  renewable  energy  sources  in  the 
various Member States can be seen in annex II. 
The importance of Res-electricity will  increase significantly over the coming years. 
The  International  Energy  Agency  (lEA)  has,  for  example,  in  its  World  Energy 
Outlook for  1998, projected that the increase in RES-E will  be  far  greater than in 
conventionally generated electricity in the Member States of  the European Union. 
This is confirmed by indications received by the Commission from the Member 
States.  The following countries
3 have indicated targets for the share of  renewables 
generated electricity (excluding large hydro, unless otherwise indicated): Austria (3% 
in 2005), United Kingdom (10% in 2010, incl. large hydro), Denmark (20% by 2005, 
79% by 2030), Finland (100 MW wind by 2005,25% increase in bioenergy by 
2005), Greece.(255-355 MW by 2003), Ireland (19.7% in 2010, incl. large hydro), 
Portugal (837 MW by 2006), Spain (1200 MW by 2000)..  -
2.3.  The White Paper 
In the White Paper on renewable sources of  energy
4 it is stated that renewable energy 
sources still make an unacceptably modest contribution to the Community's energy 
balance as compared to the available technical potential. In 1995 the contribution of 
RES to the Union's overall gross inland energy consumption was somewhat less than 
3 In replies to a ·commission questionnaire addressed to all Member States in  1998. 
• Energy for the future: renewable sources of energy. White paper for a Community strategy and action 
plan, COM{97)S99 final, 26.11.1997 
7 6%. The White Paper sets the ambitious target of a doubling of the share of  RES to 
12% by 2010. This percentage is all the more ambitious since the major part of the 
current  6%  RES-share  stems  from  large  hydro  for  which  the · development 
perspectives are very limited. The Member States have agreed that there is a need to 
promote  a  sustained  and  substantially  increased  use  of  RES  throughout  the 
Community and have welcomed the White Paper as a basis for the developmep.t of 
actions  at  Community  level  complementary  to  actions  at  national  level
5
•  This 
commitment is all  the more vital  in view of the commitments of the EC  and the 
Member States to reduce greenhouse gas emission under the Kyoto protocol. 
3.  The electricity single market Directive 
Directive 96/92/EC
6  concerning common· rules for the internal market in electricity 
provides only one explicit mechanism for the favourable treatment of  electricity from 
renewable energy sources, Article 8(3)
7
: 
"A  Member  State  may require  the  system  operator,  when  dispatching generating 
installations,  to  give  priority  to  generating  installations  using  renewable  energy 
sources or waste or producing combined heat and  power". 
This provides an exception from the basic rule, established in Article 8(2), that in 
normal  circumstances  the  dispatching  of generating  installations  and  the  use  of 
interconnectors  shall  be  determined  on  the  basis  of criteria  (which)...  "take  into 
account  the  economic  precedence  of  electricity  from  available  generating 
installations  ... ". 
This  mechanism  is,  in  fact,  one  followed  by  most  Member  States  prior  to 
liberalisation: the transmission system operator purchases renewable energy sourced 
electricity at prices higher than "traditionally" generated electricity, and passes this 
additional cost on to its captive customers, spreading the additional cost over the total 
captive consumer base. 
However, following liberalisation, it may become increasingly difficult to continue to 
base  the  support of renewables  on this  mechanism.  As  a  significant  number of 
consumers have the choice from whom to purchase electricity, they may opt not to 
purchase it from the vertically integrated System Operator.  If  so, the System Operator 
is only able to pass the cost of  the dispatching priority obligation for renewables to a 
smaller client base.  This in tum will require the System Operator to increase prices, 
as the price uplift resulting from the renewable dispatching p~ority is passed through 
to  fewer  customers.  This  in  turn may  cause  further  eligible  clients  to  purchase 
elsewhere, resulting in a vicious circle. 
' Council Resolution of  8 June 1998, OJ C 198, 24-6-1998 
6 OJ L27, 30 January 1997, p. 20 
7 A similar provision, Article 11  (3), provides for the same in the distribution and the following 
analysis is also valid for this Article. 
8 As a consequence, under a liberalised system, Member States will be under pressure 
to abandon such a mechanism for one whereby all electricity consumers, irrespective 
of their eligibility status, contribute equally towards the additional cost of supporting 
renewables.  In  the  EU  this  has  taken  place  via a  financial  support  mechanism, 
financed by all domestic electricity consumers.  Article 8(3) is not applicable to such 
schemes, as it is clearly limited to dispatching priority without any further  fin~cial 
supporting instrument. 
Thus  the  Directive  does  not  explicitly  approve  the  support  schemes  presently  m 
operation in the EU. 
Since the Directive does not justify a derogation from the application of the current 
State  aid  rules  of the  Treaty,  these  rules  are  applicable  to  financial  support 
mechanisms Member States have set up to support RES electricity. If  the assessment 
leads to the result that such support systems do  involve State aid, such aid may be 
justified in accordance With the principles laid down in the Community guidelines on 
State  aid  for  environmental  protection
8
•  Point  2.3.  of these  guidelines  specifically 
mentions promotion of renewable energies.  These guidelines will  be  reviewed  in  the 
course of 1999. 
1 OJ C 72/03 of I  0 March 1994. 
9 I.  CURRENT SUPPORT SCHEMES FOR RES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
1.  The need for support for RES 
Renewable  sources of energy  will  need  support in  the  short and  medium term to 
develop and to fulfil the Kyoto commitments. The reasons for the need of support are 
basically linked to the following two elements: 
Cost  The  biggest disadvantage of RES-E  at  the  moment  is  the  fact  that 
under the current framework conditions, characterised by the non-internalisation of· 
external costs of  energy production, costs tend to be significantly higher than those of 
conventional sources of  energy .. 
This cost disadvantage will decrease over time. Prices of  the production of  electricity 
from  RES  have reduced  considerably in the last ten years,  because of advances in 
technology and the bigger scale on which electricity from RES is produced, as can be 
seen from the table below: 
Technology  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000 (forecast) 
Area 
Wind  0.22 ~  0.57  0.11  ~  0.28  0.067 ~  0.17  0.030 ~  0.077  0.025 ~0.065 
Biomass 
a)Gasification  a)n.a.·  a) 0.077 
~ 
b) Co-firing  b) 0.061  b)n.a. 
c) Steam cycle  c) 0.12  c) 0.10  c) 0.10  c) 0.083  c) 0.074 
Small Hydro  0.02 ~  0.17  0.02 ~  0.15  0.019 ~  0.13  0.019 ~  0.12  0.019 ~  0.1 
Source : ATLAS, Compendium of Technology Modules , Energy Technology mfonnat1on base 1980-
20 I  0, European Network of Energy Agencies 
This decrease in costs has had, of  course, an impact on prices. In the United Kingdom, 
for instance, the average price paid by electricity companies for power was 2.53 pence 
per kWh in 1997, the average bid for wind(> 0.768 MW) was 3.53 pence per kWh, 
compared to 10 plkWh in 1990. For complete figures on the price development in the 
UK see Annex III. 
As a consequence of  the above, it appears correct to conclude that in order to develop 
positively  in  the  future,  renewable  generated  electricity  will  require  two  essential 
elements: a price support mechanism that enables renewables producers to enter the 
market and make a reasonable profit, and a stable regulatory environment such that 
investors can enter the market without concern that the price support mechanism will 
be modified in a manner likely to make their investment unprofitable. 
10 Infrastructure  In terms of  infrastructure, renewables generators have a number 
of  important challenges that need to be addressed: 
- planning: many projects are held up and finally do not materialise because of  lengthy 
planning procedures.  Since RES-E  is  mostly generated on a decentralised basis the 
necessary  installations  often  have  to  be  located  closer  to  communities .  than 
conventional plants. Simplified and accelerated planning procedures, preferably at the 
local  and  regional  level  that could  minimise  local  environmental  disturbances  and 
hence opposition, would facilitate a continued expansion of  RES-E. 
- grid connection issues:  the connection of  renewables generation to the grid, due 
notably to their decentralised nature and, compared to traditional generating facilities, 
their  low  unit  output,  presents  a  number  of challenges  and  opportunities  to 
transmission  and  distribution  system  operators.  Notably,  for  the  above  reasons, 
connection to the transmission grid can be  expensive, particularly where new lines 
have  to  be  laid.  However,  on  the  other  hand,  due  to  their  decentralised  nature, 
renewables  generators  can  often  feed  in  electricity  at  distribution  or  local  level, 
minimising transmission costs.  These elements, together with the need to ensure that 
connection charges are levied on a cost-reflective basis, and that the benefits of new 
connections  to  others  are  taken  into  consideration,  are  not  always,  according  to 
information available to the Commission, fully taken into account by transmission and 
distribution system operators. 
Research and technological development  Research  and  development  has  been 
essential  in  the  identification  of new  applications  and  in  the  development  and 
demonstration  of technologies  based  on  RES.  It  has  also  provided  important 
contributions  to  the  reduction  in  generating  costs  and  in  solving  technical  issues 
related to infrastructure and grid connections. Continued research and technological 
support in the pre-commercial phase will be required if RES  is to develop to  its full 
potential. 
2.  The different schemes in the Member States and at the Community level 
All Member States support RES in one or more ways, via Research and Development, 
tax reductions/exemptions, guaranteed prices, investment subsidies and the like. The 
Commission itself has been supporting for over a decade research and development in 
the  field  of renewable  energies  in  the  scope  of the  Framework  Programme  for 
Research and Development, in particular in the Non-Nuclear Energy Programme. This 
programme includes the  support to  the development and  use of renewable energies 
through research and demonstration activities, with the objectives of providing better 
and more reliable technologies, delivered at lower costs to the users. Under the Fifth 
Framework  Programme
9  this  programme  will  continue  to  contribute  actively  in 
9 Decision No 182/1999/EC ofthe European Parliament and the Council of22 December 1998 
concerning the Fifth Framework Programme of  the European Community for research, technological 
development and demonstration activities {1998-2002), OJ L 26, 1 February 1999, p.  I 
11 providing the technical  solutions to  the two  bottlenecks  identified  in  this  working 
paper. 
The  magnitude  of the  support  varies  largely  between  Member  States,  given  the 
national  situations,  both policy priority wise  and  as  far  as  the presence of natural 
resources is  concerned. A detailed description of the main support schemes wjll be 
provided for each Member State in a forthcoming Commission Staff  Working Paper. 
In summary, however, the main forms of  support are: 
•  Support from the government and the Commission  is given to almost all forms of 
RES via subsidies for research and development. The average budget for financial 
support  to  R&D  in  renewable  energy  sources  from  the  Fourth  Framework 
Programme amounted to 87.5 million ECUs ( 1995 - 1998). 
(See annex IV for details concerning budget expenditure for the individual Member 
States and for the OECD) 
•  Subsidies  for  capital  investment  or  loans  to  investments  are  given  in  some 
countries.  Relatively  higher·  levels  of  subsidy  are  given  to  promote  the 
technological  development of the  as  yet  less  economical  technologies,  such  as 
rooftop PV systems.  Technologies closer to the market, such as wind, does also in 
many cases profit from  ~ubsidies, albeit at relatively lower levels. 
•  In  a  number of countries  (notably  Germany,  Spain and,  at  present,  Denmark) 
RES-E is supported via guaranteed prices, coupled with a purchase obligation by 
the utilities. However, the levels of the guaranteed prices vary considerably from 
country to country, with, on average,  regulation in Germany, Denmark, Spain and 
Italy  offering the  highest prices to -RES-E  producers  (for details  on prices  see 
Annex III). 
The normal  form  of feed  in  tariff is  a fixed  price that all  renewable generators 
receive for the electricity generated, combined with an obligation on the system 
operator to purchase all  such electricity offered to  it.  This, for example, is the 
system  in  Germany,  the  Stromeinspeisungsgesetz.  The  fixed  tariff may  be 
modified from period to period by the appropriate regulatory authority to reflect, 
for example, falling prices due to technological progress. However, this may be 
resisted  by  existing  Res-electricity  generators.  The  tariff  may  also  be 
supplemented with subsidies from  the State, as e.g. in Denmark where a subsidy 
per kWh delivered to the grid is paid to independent producers. 
However, one key issue is the fact that under certain fixed-price feed-in schemes, 
the price is set as a percentage of  the electricity price actually sold by the utility to 
final - usually industrial - customers.  RES-E- producers receive a fixed proportion 
of  this final price, or "avoided cost".  In this manner, the actual price received by 
RES-E producers does not, necessarily, refer to any "market price" for RES-E, nor 
necessarily take account of falling  RES-E production costs due to  technological 
improvements. 
12 •  In the United Kingdom and the Republic of  Ireland a tendering system operates. 
Under this approach, the Member State decides on the desired  level of RES, 
according to the source mix (wind, biomass, solar, waste, etc.) that public policy 
dictates. It then places a series of  tenders for the supply of  the electricity, which 
would thereafter be supplied on a contract basis. The electricity is then sold by 
the authority responsible for organising the tender at market prices, financing the 
difference between sale and purchase price through a non-discriminatory levy on 
all domestic electricity consumption. This system permits a number of  variables: 
the Member State may decide the level of RES, the mix between different RES 
sources, their growth rate over time, and the level of  long-term security offered to 
producers over time. 
•  Support can also be given in the form of  voluntary green pricing schemes which 
have made an appearance in 1996 in The Netherl.ands and Sweden and are now in 
place or considered in other Member States as well.  In green pricing schemes, 
consumers can volurttatily opt to pay a premium for renewable electricity. The 
consumers pay part of the fuU extra costs that the generation of RES-E entails. 
The schemes vary considerably, the smallest commitment is asked in a  United 
States (Colorado) scheme, where consumers, who so choose, round up their bills 
to  the  nearest  dollar.  Furthermore,  consumers  can  volunteer  to  donate  into 
renewables  plans,  or they  can  opt to take  all  their electricity  from  renewable 
sources; this typically amounts to a price increase of  around 20% per kWh. 
•  Introduction of renewable specific standards/consent procedures  and regulation 
in building codes and design guidelines are implemented in some Member States 
with ~e  objective of  reducing or streamlining administrative planning barriers. The 
obligatory designation by local authorities of  eligible zones for RES-development, 
for example, (as in Denmark) also facilitates renewables growth. 
•  Some Member States also support renewable electricity via the tax system. They 
take the form of (i) exemptions from or refunds of energy taxes where they exist 
(as for example in Finland where the electricity tax is reimbursed,  in Denmark 
where the C02-tax, which is also levied on RES electricity is reimbursed, and in 
Sweden where an environmental bonus is given to wind power producers),  (ii) 
lower VAT rates on some RES-systems, like solar energy equipment in Portugal, 
(iii)  tax  exemptions  for  investments  in  small  scale  RES-E  and  (iv)  via  the 
introduction of S02 and NOx taxes as in Denmark and S_weden which especially 
favours the development of wind and hydro power. The Commission proposal for 
the taxation of  energy products (COM (97) 30) also provides for tax reductions or 
exemptions for energy from renewable energy sources. 
3.  Overview of price and renewables market penetration 
Annexes I - III provide information on the development of RES electricity and the 
prices paid to independent producers. The annexes indicate that
10 
10 All price figures have been transfonned into Euro. 
13 •  The largest increase in ·pro.duction of all  fonns of res-electricity, e?tcluding large 
hydro, measured in  percentage of the electricity consumption has taken place in 
Denmark (from 2.4% in  1990 to 6.3% in  1996), the Netherlands (from 1.4% in 
1990 to 3.5% in  1997), Spain (from 2.6% in  1994 to 4.0% in  1996) and Sweden 
(from 4.1% in  1994 to 5.3% in  1996), while it has remained rather stable in the 
other Member States (e.g. Gennany where it increased slightly from 2.2% in  1994 
to 2.4% in  1997, Belgium stable at 0.9%) . 
•  Concerning the capacity development, figures  on  installed wind power capacity 
show the  largest increases in  Denmark, where the capacity increased from  343 
MW in  1990 to 1111 MW in  1997, Gennany, where it increased from 48 MW in 
1990 to 1966 MW in  1997. Spain where it increased from 7 MW in  1990 to 455 
MW in  1997. In  the Netherlands, it increased from 57 MW to  330 MW and in 
United Kingdom from 10 MW to 322 MW in the same period. 
•  That  potential  new. investors  in  res  generating  plants  receive  the  highest 
remuneration per kWh delivered to the grid in Gennany (€ 0.086), Italy (€ 0.083), 
Denmark (€ 0.079, including subsidy from the State) and Spain (€ 0.068). 
•  That the remuneration has been stable since 1990 in Gennany and Denmark which 
have fixed prices, while it has decreased by 50% in United Kingdom in the same 
period from € 0.099 to € 0.049. 
4.  Preliminary examination of  direct support schemes 
4.1.  Introduction 
As part of its preparations for this Working Paper the Commission has examined the 
advantages and disadvantages of direct support schemes presently existing in the EU, 
or future possible alternatives. 
In undertaking thus analysis, the Commission has considered four main issues: 
1.  The compatibility of the schemes  with  the basic  Community  rules  on  the 
internal market and state aid. 
As the market share for renewables generated electricity increases, the Treaty rules 
on the freedom of movement of goods and state aid are likely to come increasingly 
into play.  In particular, schemes that limit support to renewable generation only at 
domestic  level,  and do not apply to imported electricity generated under equal 
conditions will, in due course, conflict with the internal market and state aid rules 
of the Treaty.  Thus,  all  national support mechanisms  will  over time  need  to 
incorporate the possibility for imported renewables generated electricity to have 
access to domestic support schemes on a non-discriminatory basis. It is important 
to  determine  the  extent  to  which  the  different  schemes  comply  with  this 
requirement. 
2.  The ability of the schemes  to  provide a stable regulatory environment.  In 
developing markets such as  the one  under consideration, which  depends for its 
survival  and growth on  financial  support, regulatory certainty is important. Two 
issues are relevant here; (i) does the support scheme itself provide a stable support 
14 mechanism to generators?, and (ii) do doubts as to its legality under the EU rules 
in the  medium. term threaten to  undermine,  or at least  attenuate,  any  benefits 
identified under (i) above ? 
3.  The efficiency of  the schemes, in static terms (i.e. ability to ensure that electricity 
is generated and sold at minimum cost) and, in dynamic terms (i.e. ability to foster 
innovation, thus, again, driving down cost), and their effectiveness (i.e. ability to 
increase Res-generation levels). 
4.  Political  or administrative  consequences  of the  schemes  which  may  have 
effects on their effectiveness as support mechanisms. 
Whilst this analysis is a preliminary one, and will be further elaborated in the light of 
comments received following publication of  this paper, the following summarises the 
Commission's initial findings in these respects: 
4.2.  Fixed feed-in tariffs 
4.2.1.  Compatibility with EU Treaty rules 
Fixed  feed-in  tariff schemes  do  not  permit  trade  at  present,  and  do  not  permit 
competition between Res-generators. Furthermore, it is difficult to determine how, in 
their present form, they could incorporate the possibility of  trade, at least whilst they 
fail  to  ensure equivalent price reductions to  competition/quota based systems, and 
other quota/competition systems  exist in  neighbouring  Member States.  Where  for 
example, a given country maintains a relatively high priced fixed feed-in tariff, but its 
neighbotirs  practice  lower-priced  competitive  mechanisms,  generators  in the  latter 
countries will increasingly be attracted to export their capacity to the higher priced 
neighbour. This could for example happen in a situation where Germany continued to 
pay high fixed feed-in prices while the Netherlands introduced a competition-based 
system where the total payment would be lower than the German price. Dutch RES 
producers may therefore gain by selling the electricity to a German utility which has 
an unlimited obligation to purchase the electricity fed in. 
4.2.2.  Secure regulatory environment 
Feed-in  tariffs  provide  a  high  level  of short-term  regulatory  security  to  potential 
investors, as they are guaranteed a fixed return on investment. This is an important 
advantage, and one that has been translated into the creation of  generation capacity. 
However,  two  important  issues  remain  to  be  addressed  in  this  respect.  First,  the 
security only exists so long as prices are not modified, or modified frequently, by the 
regulatory  authority  responsible  for  setting  the  tariff.  As  costs  reduce  due  to 
technological  development,  the  feed-in  tariff must  logically  be  reduced.  As  any 
reduction is decided at government level, this inevitably provides uncertainty. 
Second,  for  the  reasons  mentioned  above,  there  are  important questions  as  to  the 
legality  of such schemes  under the  EU  state  aid  and  internal  market rules  in the 
medium term. The resultant uncertainty may, over time, limit investor confidence. 
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As  mentioned  above,  in tenns of their  effectiveness  in  increasing  levels  of Res-
generation,  the  fixed  feed-in  tariff scheme  has  been highly  effective.  The highest 
levels of Res-generation increase  have  taken place in recent years  in countries  in 
which such a mechanism operat~s. 
However, in tenns of  static efficiency, significant shortcomings of  such schemes have 
been identified. 
Indeed,  the  major  disadvantage  of  fixed  feed-in  tariffs  identified  during  the 
Commission's analysis relates to the static efficiency of  such schemes. As can be seen 
from the pricing infonnation in Annex Ill, fixed feed-in tariff schemes have failed to 
produce price reduction$ for  Res-electricity.  Two  important factors  contributing to 
this have been identified. 
•  First, fixed-price schemes are not able to react flexibility and quickly to possible 
price reductions resulting from efficiency gains, as any price reduction decision 
must be taken by the appropriate regulatory authority. 
•  Second,  as  mentioned  above,  the  feed-in  tariff should  be  reviewed  to  avoid 
excessive  profits  for  new producers  when  technological  development  implies 
lower production costs. However, whether the tariff is fixed in absolute tenns or 
as a percentage of the market price for electricity from "traditional" sources, it 
may  only  be  changed  through  regulatory  intervention.  This  may  prove  to  be 
unpopular and thus politically difficult to  carry out as existing producers have 
strong economic interest in ensuring continued high pricing levels payments. 
Furthennore, with respect to dynamic efficiency important question-marks exist with 
respect to  fixed  feed-in  tariff schemes.  As  the  system  is  not one  based  on  direct 
competition,  either  amongst  Res-generators,  or  between  Res-generators  and 
''traditional" electricity producers, the incentive for innovation must, by definition, be 
less pronounced than under a scheme that is based on competition. 
4.2.4.  Political/administrative issues 
Once  a  significant  level  of renewables  generated  electricity  develops,  and  the 
consequent price uplift to overall electricity tariffs becomes appreciable, the need to 
demonstrate  "value-for-money"  and  the  avoidance  of monopoly  profits  becomes 
increasingly vital if  continued public support for large levels of  Res-electricity is to be 
maintained.  This reason,  for  example,  has  recently  led the  Danish Government to 
announce its intention to move away from a fixed tariff system towards one based on 
competition. In this respect, therefore, the long-tenn maintenance of a feed-in tariff 
system may be difficult. 
16 In administrative tenns, however, it should be  noted that a fixed  feed-in tariff is  a 
system that requires little regulation or "bureaucracy". 
4.2.5.  Concluding remarks 
From the above it is generally accepted that the move from  a fixed tariff approach 
towards one based on trade and competition is at some stage inevitable; notably when 
renewable  generated electricity makes  up  a significant proportion of total  national 
electricity consumption.  Once, however,  competition is  introduced, prices will  fall, 
leaving certain generators that entered the market on the basis of higher, guaranteed, 
prices,  stranded.  In many  cases,  this  may  need  to  be  resolved through expensive 
stranded cost mechanisms. 
Thus, on the basis of  an examination of  the schemes presently in operation in the EU, 
and in the light of  experience gained in the implementation of  the Electricity Directive 
96/92,  it might be argued that whilst a fixed  feed  in tariff might be  considered an 
appropriate  mechanism  to  ensure  low-level  market  take-off,  it may  suffer  from  a 
number of important disadvantages  in the  medium  tenn.  Indeed,  once  a minimal 
critical  mass of RES-generated electricity is produced, such schemes may  even  be 
counter-productive to their underlying objective of increasing RES-generation levels, 
as  they  might fail  to  produce "value for  money" through price cuts and efficiency 
gains, on the basis of which support for increasing levels of RES electricity depends 
in the coming years. 
4.3.  Quota (Competition-based) systems 
4.3.1.  Compatibility with the EU Treaty rules 
In  principle such  schemes  do  not  present  major difficulties  in  this  respect,  as,  by 
definition, they envisage competition between Res-generators. 
4.3.2.  Secure Regulatory environment 
It is correct that, in general, fixed price schemes do provide a higher degree of  security 
than  quota/competition-based  schemes.  Indeed,  in  many  respects  this  security  of 
fixed-price  schemes, together with their relatively high prices,  are  main  factors  for 
their success in producing rapid levels of renewables generation growth in countries 
using such systems. 
However, it is  possible to  introduce competition-based schemes which provide, by 
design, a very considerable level of  security. 
For example, it should be  noted that a tendering-based scheme provides a level of 
security for successful tenderers that is  higher than for fixed price feed-in schemes. 
Once a tenderer has been successful, the company in  question then receives a fixed 
purchase price for the electricity supplied for  the duration of the supply contract -
17 similar, in fact,  to  Power Purchase Agreements in the "traditional" electricity sector. 
The duration of  this fixed price depends on the terms and conditions of  the tender, and 
can be set by the regulatory authority in the light of the market related necessity to 
guarantee long term price security to attract relevant levels of  supply.  Once the tender 
is closed, the contractual situation guarantees that the tenderer in question receives the 
agreed  and  fixed  remuneration for  the  electricity produced for  the  full  term of the 
contract period. 
4.3.3.  Efficiency and effectiveness 
With  respect  to  static  and  dynamic  efficiency,  as  can  be  seen  in  annex  3, 
quota/competition-based schemes have been the most effective in the EU in driving 
down prices for renewable generated electricity and, according to  economic theory, 
as a result of  the competition, stimulating innovation. 
However, with respect .to  their effectiveness in terms of increasing Res-generation 
levels, they have been less effective than fixed-price schemes. The Commission has 
examined the reasons behind this trend. 
One major difficulty faced by the NFFO (the UK tendering system) has been the fact 
that numerous successful tenders have in fact  not installed the contracted capacity. 
For example, of the  1251  MW  given out  in  contracts  under the  first  three NFFO 
orders (1990,  1991  and 1994), an amount of only 443  MW had been commissioned 
as  at  30/9/1997
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•  The reason for this was the inability for  successful tenderers to 
acquire  the  requisite  planning  permission  to  construct  the  renewable  generating 
facility  sufficiently  quickly.  This,  however,  is  not  an  argument  as  to  why 
competition-based systems, and in particular a tendering-based system, are unable to 
develop renewables growth levels envisaged or required.  The only issue involved in 
the NFFO system as a growth constraint has been the issue of  plaiming.  Such issues 
related  to  planning  can  be  addressed  by  Member  States  if they  are  sufficiently 
determined to do so: for example, the Danish System of  identifying, in advance, areas 
where permission to  build renewables generating capacity is  granted.  This issue  is 
independent of  the issue of  the type of  support scheme and will facilitate, or limit, the 
growth of renewables in  an equal manner irrespective of the nature of the support 
scheme. 
Another issue with respect to the long-term efficiency of such schemes relates to the 
concern that the fixing of an Res-quota, the basis of such schemes, which results in 
the creation of an artificial and separate market from  the overall electricity market, 
may  have  significant  draw-backs.  By  isolating  the  RES-market  from  the  overall 
market,  this  may  reduce  competitive  pressures  on  the  RES  segment  overall,  thus 
limiting  the  movement  towards  RES-electricity  becoming  fully  competitive  with 
electricity from "traditional" sources. This argument merits careful consideration, as 
a number of examples exist of the enduring nature of support schemes for products 
that are artificially isolated from competitive pressure. 
However,  it  does  appear  that,  if properly  established,  these  type  of quota-based 
competitive support schemes may well be able to overcome this possible difficulty. In 
11  Source: Renewable Energy Bulletin No 7, Department of  Trade & Industry, 25 November 1997. 
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RES-generators. This requires that the quota is set at a level which is {a) low enough 
to ensure that existing RES-E producers face competition from potential new entrants, 
and  (b)  high enough to  ensure that there is vigorous competition between different 
producers.  Accordingly,  to  determine  quotas  accurately,  regulators  need  detailed 
information about costs and generation capacities of the various types of renewable 
technologies (which may not be easy to obtain) if  the quota is set an appropriate level. 
If this occurs, competition-based schemes ensure that, through competition between 
different suppliers, prices will, where economically possible, continue to fall.  In the 
event  that  prices  fall  close  to  those  for  "traditional" generated  electricity,  support 
schemes can be phased out, eliminating the "quota" element. 
Furthermore,  the  competition-based  system  schemes  outlined  above  (i.e.  those 
presently  in  existence or preparation in  the  EU),  are  not  an exhaustive  list.  Other 
schemes,  that specifically avoid the explicit or implicit political determination of a 
"renewables quota" might be envisaged, see below point 4.4. 
4.3.4.  Political/administrative issues 
It  is  correct that,  in  general, competition-based systems do  require  more  regulatory 
and  administrative  arrangements  than  a  fixed  feed-in  tariff.  However,  if 
quota/competition-based  support  schemes  are  implemented  appropriately,  the 
regulatory issues can be substantially limited. 
4.3.5.  Concluding remarks 
It is clear therefore, that whist such schemes do present a number of important issues 
that need to be addressed, they do present a number of advantages for the long-term 
support of  Res-generators in the context of  the internal market. 
It  should  be  noted,  in  this  context,  that  the  tendering  based-system  presently  in 
operation in the United Kingdom and the Republic of  Ireland is not the only possible 
approach  to  the  introduction of a  quota/competition based  scheme.  An  alternative 
approach, that is expected to be introduced shortly in the Netherlands and Denmark, is 
based  on  green  certificates.  Under  this  system,  such  certificates .are  issued  to 
producers  of renewable  electricity  and  are  issued  according  to  the  amount  of 
electricity  (kWh)  produced  (autogenerator)  or  sold  into  the  grid  (commercial 
generators). The RES  electricity that is generated competes with other electricity for 
sales, and receives, therefore the "market price" for  the electricity sold.  In order to 
finance the additional cost of  producing RES electricity, and to ensure that the desired 
RES  electricity  is  generated,  a  purchasing  obligation  or  quota  is  placed  on  all 
consumers to purchase green certificates according to a fixed percentage of  their total 
electricity  consumption.  Each  consumer  is  therefore  obliged  to  purchase  green 
certificates  representing  x%  of its  total  electricity  consumption.  In  this  manner, 
physical  flows  do  not  necessarily  match  actual  purchases.  Renewable  producers 
receive  the  "normal"  market  price  for  electricity,  and,  in  addition,  they  receive  a 
payment  for. their  green  certificates,  which  will  necessarily  be  a  function  of the 
difference  between  the  price  of "normal"  electricity  and  the  cost  of producing 
19 renewable sourced electricity. In this manner, a secondary market develops, inevitably 
via  a  trading  mechanism,  and  usually  via  a  commodity  exchange,  whereby  RES 
producers compete with one-another for the sale of  the green certificates, and thus the 
RES electricity. 
An alternative measure consists of  putting the obligation to ensure that RES electricity 
accounts for a minimum share of  the overall electricity consumption on the electricity 
suppliers, which would be obliged to ensure that x% of  the electricity that they supply 
is generated from  renewable sources.  The suppliers would then have the choice to 
generate the RES  electricity themselves  or buy  it  in the  form  of certificates from 
producers with surplus production. In this manner extra costs from  producing RES 
electricity is shared between all suppliers and consequently by the consumers as these 
extra costs will be passed on.  Thus, the final result would be the same as  described 
above  where  the  purchasing  obligation  is  on  the  consumers.  Italy  envisages  the 
introduction of  such a scheme. 
It should be noted that one advantage of such an approach over tendering schemes is 
that it results in a constant competitive pressure being exerted on generators, which 
can only result in improved dynamic efficiency. 
4.4.  Fixed Premium Schemes 
4.4.1.  Introduction 
During its preparation for this Working Paper, the Commission has also examined 
possible alternative support mechanisms, not yet introduced or envisaged in the EU. 
One  such  approach  might  be  a  mechanism  that  introduces  a  certain  level  of 
competition/internal market rules in the context of  a fixed premium approach. 
The objectives of such an approach would be to overcome as much as possible the 
disadvantages of a fixed-price approach, whilst nonetheless harnessing its benefits. In, 
addition,  it would seek to introduce competition/internal  market discipline  into the 
market, without fixing specific "renewables quotas" 
Whilst it  is too early to point to the particular details of such an approach, it might 
contain some or all of  the following elements: 
•  Rather than a fixed-price,  a fixed  premium might be set, to be  paid to all  Res-
generators, on the basis of  kWh of electricity sold into the grid. Producers might 
receive  no  priority  dispatch,  so  they  would  be  required  to  compete  with 
"traditional" electricity  generators  for  market  share.  This  latter competition,  if 
effective, might over time indirectly drive down the overall electricity price and 
thus the price for Res-generated electricity. 
•  The actual premium level might be set to take account of a number of elements, 
including,  possibly,  internalisation  costs,  "infant  industry"  premiums,  and 
mechanisms to  reduce  the premiums in line  with reducing costs resulting from 
innovation. 
20 •  The premium might be paid to Res-electricity purchasers, which would then select 
the  most  efficient,  or  cheapest,  generator,  thereby  encouraging  competition 
amongst renewable generators. 
·  •  The premium may be financed from a non discriminatory levy on all electricity 
consumers. 
•  A different premium might be set for different types of renewables generation to 
reflect their different costs. 
Whilst the Commission's analysis of such possible schemes is at an early stage, the 
possible advantages/disadvantages of  such a mechanism may include the following: 
4.4.2.  Compatibility with the EU Treaty rules 
Insofar as such a mechanism could ensure that the premium is set at a level that would 
introduce  effective  competition,  .trade  with  and  between  other  systems  appears 
feasible. 
4.4.3.  Secure regulatory environment 
Again, if  a premium can be set in a manner such that active competition develops, and 
that the prices for Res-generated electricity do reflect falling costs due to innovation, 
such a  syst~m would present a secure legal environment. However, the fact that the 
premium would need to be regularly reduced to reflect falling costs might, at least 
potentially, undennine the resultant certainty. 
4.4.4.  Efficiency and effectiveness 
Within a system of competition-related premiums, such systems might well resolve 
some of the disadvantages of fixed  feed-in tariffs outlined above.  In particular, by 
introducing an element of  competition, the static and dynamic efficiency limitations 
of a  fixed  feed-in  tariff may  be reduced.  In particular, the permanent competitive 
pressure  on  Res-generators  competing  for  market  share  may  provide  a  constant 
incentive  for  manufactures  to  increase  efficiency  and  to  innovate,  similar to  that 
resulting  from  green certificate  schemes  and tendering  mechanisms  which  launch 
regular tenders. However, it should be underlined that the ability of  such a mechanism 
to have this effect rests on the capacity to ensure that the premium accurately reflects 
the cost of  generating Res-electricity at any given moment. 
With respect to effectiveness in terms of increasing renewables generation, however, 
much will depend on (i) the level at which any price premium would be set, and (ii) 
whether some form of  predictability can be given regarding its future amendment. 
4.4.5.  PoliticaVadministrative issues. 
21 The  principal  possible difficulty  with respect to  such  schemes would  relate  to  the 
fixing of  the level of  the premium, and its revision. 
4.4.6.  Concluding remarks 
A present, no such scheme has been introduced or is  in preparation in any Member 
State. The Commission will continue to analyse this model, particularly in terms of 
how methods to  ensure that a premium could be set and permitted to evolve at an 
appropriate level might be developed. 
4.5.  Conclusion 
This analysis is a preliminary one. It  will be further developed following the adoption 
of this  Working Paper, ·and  in  particular in the  light of comments received by the 
Commission on the above 
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In the light of the above, it appears that a number of possible objectives need to be 
taken  into  consideration  in  deciding  how  best  to  address  the  objectives  of the 
Community and the Member States in this area: 
•  The  establishment of regulatory  framework  that  is  (i)  rational  and  efficiency 
enhancing (and thus cost reducing and innovation promoting), (ii) long-term (i.e. 
not  subject  to  frequent  regulatory  change),  and  (iii)  effective  in  producing 
significant growth in renewable sourced electricity. 
•  A gradual and progressive movement towards any such regulatory framework to 
ensure  that  progress  made  to  date  in  increasing  renewables  levels  is  not 
jeopardised and that key environmental objectives are met. 
•  A  significant  push,  across  the  Community,  by  all  Member  States  to  increase 
renewables  penetration in all  EU  markets,  thus  increasing  economies of scale 
particularly in manufacturing costs, and thus driving down costs. 
•  A  number of measures to  facilitate  access of RES-E to the  internal  electricity 
market.  Such measures, which should be taken by all Member States, should, for 
example, aim at ensuring that planning, administrative and grid connection rules 
reduce to  the  minimum constraints  in  these areas  on the growth of renewable 
sourced electricity in the EU. 
It is clear that, at present, the disparate support schemes across the EU will need to 
evolve in order to fully address these issues. 
In  the  light  of this,  and  taking  into  account  experience  gained  regarding  the 
liberalisation of the electricity market in general, there are significant arguments in 
favour of  the progressive creation of  a EU market for renewable generated electricity. 
Any such action or proposal  must be viewed within the context of the EU'  s  most 
·basic objectives in this area: the significant and continual growth of RES generated 
electricity within a framework that captures all the benefits of  this energy source. 
The  creation  of such  a  single  market  in  many  other  areas,  notably  transport, 
telecommunications, electricity and gas, clearly demonstrates the advantages of the 
single  market· process  in  terms  of increasing  efficiency,  improving  technological 
innovation, and lowering price.  Aside from the legal requirements flowing directly 
from the Treaty in this respect, there are a number of reasons why the progressive 
development of such  a  market  might  be  viewed  as  important.  These  have  been 
addressed in some detail above. 
In order to reach this objective of a better functioning of  the single market, there are 
two basic options presently available to the Community that need to be addressed : 
23 Option 1: Gradual achievement of  an internal market through continued application of 
the EU Treaty rules 
Under this option, each Member State would continue to freely choose the support 
system that it views as most appropriate in the light of its particular circumstances; 
subject, however, to the continued application of the EU Treaty rules, notably those 
with respect to  state  aid.  The arguments. in favour of such  an option include  the. 
following: 
•  the  physical  conditions  relevant  to  the  development  of renewable  generated 
electricity differ significantly across the EU. It might be considered appropriate to 
limit the pro-active development of  a single market in this area to ensure that each 
Member State takes the measures most appropriate to its particular situation. 
'  •  As mentioned above, one argument in favour of  a fixed-price feed-in tariff system, 
is  its  possible  appropriateness  to  ensure  the  rapid  take-off  of renewables 
generation  from  very  low  levels,  which  is  the  existing  situation for  most  EU 
Member States. 
It is clear, in this respect, however, that the EU Treaty rules, and in particular those 
with respect to state aid, will continue to apply to such schemes. In the medium to 
long term it is Jikely that the application of  these rules will progressively lead, in any 
. event, to the development of a single market, i.e.  systems that permit the effective 
trade and thus competition in renewable generated electricity. Thus, a clear option in 
this respect is not to provide for Community action in the form of  specific legislation 
leading towards specific "single market" provisions at this stage, but to permit this to 
evolve over time. 
Whilst this approach would have clear advantages as mentioned above, it would suffer 
from  the disadvantage of maintaining  a  certain  level  of regulatory  uncertainly,  as 
changes to national systems may result over time as a consequence of legal action 
under the state aid rules. This uncertainty, inter alia, may discourage new investment 
in renewable electricity generation. 
Two  further  possible  disadvantages of such  an  approach  might  be  that  (i)  in  the 
absence  of a  pro-active  approach  by  the  Community  towards  the  creation  of an 
effective single market in this area, the development of an effective single market 
would undoubtedly take much longer, depriving the Community of the benefits that 
would  flow  from  a  single  market  during  this  interim  period,  and  (ii)  during  this 
interim period the difficulties of the contemporaneous co-existence of different and, 
from a trading viewpoint, probably incompatible schemes, would continue to exist. 
Option 2: Proactive creation of  a single market through Community action 
Under  this  approach  one  might  envisage  the  adoption  of a  basic  Community 
framework, probably in the form of a Directive. Member States would have to ensure 
that,  after  an  appropriate  transitional  period,  their  direct  support  schemes  for 
renewable generated electricity would comply with a number of  basic requirements, in 
24 such  a  manner  that  would. ensure  that  the  different  schemes  were  sufficiently 
compatible with one another, permitting effective trade and, thus, competition. 
In  the  light  of comments  received  following  the  publication  of this  report,  the 
Commission will further consider which of  these basic options should be pursued. 
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1.  Basic Options 
In  the  event  that  it  would  be  decided  to  adopt  a  pro-active  approach,  an~ther 
fundamental  option would need to be addressed with regard  to  the type of system 
necessary or appropriate to produce an effective single market. In fact there are three 
basic  types  of mechanisms  that  might  be  envisaged  in  this  respect,  quota-based 
schemes, fixed renewable premium schemes, and "mixed" ~chemes: 
Option 1. Quota-based schemes 
Such  competition-based  schemes  are  designed  on  the  basis  of setting  a  quota  at 
governmental level, and via a competition-based mechanism, ensuring that this quota 
is filled through competition between different renewables suppliers. The tendering-
based schemes in the United Kingdom and Republic of  Ireland are examples of  such a 
mechanism. The green-certificate approach to be implemented in  Denmark and the 
Netherlands, is an alternative. 
Under such an approach, therefore, all Member States would have ensure that their 
schemes followed these  basic characteristics of ensuring competition between  Res-
electricity suppliers, and permitting trade between Member States.  Evidently~ within 
this requirement, the maximum possible freedom would be left to Member states to 
decide  the  type  of competition/quota  mechanism  best  suited  to  its  particular 
circumstances, providing, however, that it provided for equivalent results in terms of 
promoting effective competition and trade. 
Option 2: Fixed-premium schemes. 
Under such option, Member States would be required to modify, if necessary, their 
systems, to ensure that they pursued a fixed-premium-based approach. Again, under 
such an approach, Member States should be left with the maximum possible freedom 
to  determine the  specific details of their national  scheme provided,  however,  they 
would result in equivalent price levels, and permit trade between Member Sates. 
Option 3: Mixed schemes 
Under such an approach, Member States would be free to choose between the two 
types  of schemes  mentioned  above.  The  function  of a  Community  instrument, 
therefore, would be to endeavour to  lay  some basic principles that Member States 
would  need  to  follow  to  ensure  that  the  schemes  were  functionally  compatible; 
permitting, therefore, competition and trade to exist. 
It is at present uncertain, however, if  or how such an approach might work in practice. 
The co-existence of competition/quota-based schemes and premium-related schemes 
presents  a  number of problems  with  respect to  their  compatibility.  This  issue,  in 
26 particular, will be further examined in the light of  the comments received ,following 
publication of  this text.  · 
2.  Supplementary Issues 
In the event that Community proposals would be put forward, a number of  additional 
elements will need to be carefully examined to ensme that the scheme (i) would enter 
into force effectively and (ii) would result in the minimum possible difficulties for 
existing  producers.  Amongst  such  measures,  the  following  merit  careful 
consideration. 
2.1.  Definition of renewable sourced elec:tric:ity 
For the purposes of  any action in this area, the definition of  RES-electricity would be 
crucial.  As one of the underlying objectives of any proposal would be to maximise 
the effectiveness of support schemes for renewables generators across the EU, it is 
vital that the definition of renewables results in only those renewables producers that 
need support, actually receiving it.  The following issues, in particular, merit careful 
consideration: 
Large Hydro 
Electricity produced from hydro power plants is, clearly, electricity generated from a 
renewable source.  However, there are reasons for excluding large hydro (i.e. with an 
installed capacity above 10 MW) from the scope of the definition of RES-E for the 
purposes of  a Community proposal: 
•  In  general,  electricity  from  large  hydro  plants  is  competitive  with  electricity 
produced from conventional fuels. Most large hydro plants have been in operation 
for many years, which means that the initial investment has been amortised. It is 
important, for the development of  the European RES sector, that support schemes 
encourage  the  development  of otherwise  non-economic  RES  generation.  They 
should not provide windfall profits to already competitive RES production. 
•  The  potential  development  possibilities  of large  hydro  are  limited  due  to 
environmental  constraints.  The  White  Paper on RES  only  projects  a  potential 
increase in the capacity of 10% in large hydro in 2010 compared to the 1995level. 
Any necessary support to exploit this potential should therefore be given outside 
the scope of  any Community proposal, i.e. via specific state aid. 
Waste 
The potential inclusion or exclusion waste raises a number of  important issues: 
27 •  The contribution of non-organic waste does not provide the same environmental 
benefits as other RES-generators. 
•  On the other hand, subject to appropriate processing techniques, the combustion of 
non-organic  waste  is  environmentally  preferable  to  its  disposal  via  land-fill 
provided the energy is recovered. 
•  The  production  of electric:ity  from  organic  waste  can  be  highly  efficient  and 
competitive.  Some representations received by the Commission have argued that 
the support of organic waste in the· same context of an overall EU Directive on 
RES-E support schemes would detract from  efforts to support and develop such 
renewable technologies as wind.  . 
•  In principle, any  Community instrument provided it is  in  line with Community 
legislation  on  waste  recycling  should  permit  Member  States  the  maximum 
possible freedom to determine the choice of  energy sources they wish to make up 
the overall renewables supply to their market. 
These issues will be further examined and assessed in the light of  the reactions to this 
Working Paper. 
2.2. Transitional periods 
The introduction of a single market for RES-electricity based on competition would 
need to  be gradual  (i) to ensure that no  dislocation in market growth resulted from 
abrupt regulatory change,  (ii) to  provide all  Member States with the  possibility of 
using other support schemes to  build up  initial  renewables generation levels to  the 
point that an internal market based system could be effectively introduced, and (iii) 
ensure that environmental objectives, such as the Kyoto commitments, are achieved. 
An interim  period  - or  long  transposition  period  - would  therefore  need  to  be 
provided for during which it would need to be specified that Member States would be 
free to maintain in force the support schemes that they consider most appropriate in 
order to increase existing RES-E level to pennit the effective introduction of a single 
market. 
The  precise  length  of such  a transposition  period  will  need  to  be  determined,  if 
necessary, in the light of  the comments received on the basis of  this Working Paper. 
Furthermore, in order to guarantee that the introduction of  the single market does not, 
taking account of the particular situation in certain Member States, cause particular 
problems,  it  might  be  appropriate  to  provide  an  additional  mechanism  whereby 
Member  States  could  apply  to  the  Commission  for  an  extension  to  the  above 
mentioned "automatic" transposition period.  Thus the length of  the transitional period 
would  be  sufficiently  flexible  so  as  to  ensure  that  Member  States'  environmental 
goals such as the Kyoto commitments are not jeopardised. 
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Any proposal will need to pay particular attention to small isolated electricity systems 
and  newly  emergent  market  segments,  characterised  by  immature  technologieS. 
Depending on the particular circumstances of the case in question, a single market 
· based system might not be the most appropriate manner to deal with the partif:Ular 
issues  and  difficulties  in question.  For· example,  with  respect to newly  emergent 
market segments, the level of  supply might be so limited, or so concentrated, it would 
be  ineffective to  endeavour to  develop  a competition-based market in the  short to 
medium term. 
2.4.  Transitional"regimes ("stranded costs") 
In order to ensure the effective introduction of  internal market based schemes, it may 
well  be necessary and appropriate for ·rather wide-~ging transitional regimes - or 
stranded cost schemes - to be introduced at national level.  With the introduction of 
the  internal  market,  prices  will  fall.  For numerous  renewable  sourced  electricity 
generators which have previously entered the market and operated under higher, fixed 
price schemes, such lower price levels may threaten their viability.  The market ~it  of 
non-obsolete renewable sourced generating facilities cannot be the objective of any 
potential proposal.  Thus, Member States may judge it necessary, during a fixed time 
period,  to  provide  separate  additional  mechanisms  for  the  continued  support  of 
existing market participants, such as the maintenance of fixed feed-in tariff schemes 
for these suppliers, or other specific support mechanisms.  Such mechanisms will of 
course have to comply with the State aid rules of  the Treaty. Any legislative proposal 
in  this  area  would  need  to  make  adequate  provision  for  the  approval  of such 
mechanisms where necessary. 
2.5.  Certification of  origin 
In addition to, and independently of, the issues raised above, in order to permit trade 
between Member States to  take place .  effectively in practice, a certification system 
might be necessary.  Such a system would permit purchasers to  be certain that the 
electricity acquired  is  generated  from  renewable  sources.  In the absence of such a 
system,  not  only  would  it  be  difficult  for  potential  importers  to  identify,  RES 
producers, but the "multiple sale" of  RES produced electricity may pose a problem. 
Whilst a single EU certification system and control and verification mechanism might 
in many respects be the most effective approach to this certification issue, at least at 
an initial stage it appears that·it would be appropriate to allow each Member State to 
be  responsible  for  issuing  the  certificates  to  RES  producers  in  its  territory.  The 
certificates would be mutually recognised. 
It would have to be accepted, however, that the issue of fraud in this area might be a 
problem that would need to be avoided ab initio. The certificates in question would be 
valuable and, without appropriate control procedures, susceptible to fraud. To permit 
effective mutual recognition it is important that mutual confidence would develop. To 
29 encourage and  develop this, one might envisage that (i)  Member  States might be 
legally obliged to put into place appropriate mechanisms to ensure certification is both 
accurate and reliable; (ii) Member States might be obliged, by a given date, to produce 
a yearly report outlining the measures taken to ensure that fraud does not exist; (iii) 
the  Commission, on the  basis of national  reports,  might produce a  regular overall 
report; and (iv) a "Follow-up Group" of national experts, which could be  creat~ in 
the context of  any proposal, could consider, at least annually, experience in this area, 
and any measures or improvements that might be appropriate. It may, eventually, have 
to be assessed if it would be necessary to legislate at Community level to reduce the 
administrative  burden  of having  15  different  national  systems  of certification  of 
origin. 
2.6.  Minimum support levels for RES-electricity 
In the event that it  would be decided to take a pro-active approach toward the creation 
of a single market, the question also arises whether it would  be  appropriate to set 
some obligations on each Member State with the objective of ensuring a minimum 
level of  support for renewable generated electricity in each country. In the event that 
any Community framework would be based on quotas/competition, this might be in 
the foz:m of  a minimum quota or consumption level which each Member State would 
be obliged to attain. In the event that a fixed price/premium system would be pursued, 
some  obligations  might  be  envisaged  as  to  the  methodology  of fixing  the  price 
premium, or indeed, its level. 
The reasons for such approach might be based on the concern that, in order for  a 
competitive and effective internal  market for  RES-electricity to  develop and  to  be 
easily and effectively introduced, a minimum critical mass of  RES sourced electricity 
in all EU countries might be viewed as an important element.  Furthermore, in order 
to limit trade distortions due to different prices of electricity across the EU resulting 
from  different levels of RES-electricity support in different Member States, it may 
equally be appropriate  to  ensure a  minimum  level  of RES-electricity  support and 
generation across the Community.  For these reasons, it might be said that there is a 
case for  minimum RES-electricity support levels or minimum tariff considerations 
that all Member States would have to achieve within a given time frame. 
Such an approach would also be consistent with, and a major step forward towards, 
the meeting of the EU'  s objectives in the environment and energy fields.  Not only 
would such an approach be fully consistent with the White Paper on RES, which was 
welcomed by the Council, and which sets an objective of 12 % RES of total energy 
use  by  20 t 0,  it would also  lay  the  foundations  for the achievement of the climate 
change  commitments  accepted  by  the  EU  at  Kyoto.  In  order  to  meet  these 
commitments, significant change will need to take place, and to a significant extent 
this change will  need to  be centred on the EU  electricity industry.  The manner in 
which  the  necessary  reduction  is  made  is  primarily  a  matter  to  be  dealt  with  at 
national level. 
30 In  these  respects,  therefore,  the  introduction of common  minimum  RES-electricity . 
consumption levels  or minimum  tariff considerations would contribute towards the 
EU's environmental and energy policies in this area. However, it should be underlined 
that the Commission has reached no conclusion on the appropriateness or necessity of 
including  any  minimum  and  binding  consumption  levels  or  minimum  tariff 
consideration within any  possible  proposal.  There are  also  arguments  in  favo~r of 
leaving this  issue  to  subsidarity.  The  Council  has  welcomed  the  White  Paper  on 
renewable sources of  energy which fixes an indicative target of 12% renewable energy 
in the overall E.U. energy balance by 2010. It is for each Member State, however, to 
decide how to contribute to the achievement of  this objective. 
Similar  considerations  relate  to  each  Member  States'  approach  towards  the 
achievement  of  its  sub-commitment  within  the  EU's  overall  climate  change 
commitments.  Clearly,  all  Member  States  will  significantly  increase  their 
consumption  of Res-generated  electricity  as  an  integral  part  of the  package  of 
measures that they will take to meet their commitments and their support of  the White 
Paper. However, one might argue that Member States should be left entirely free  in 
the determination of  the overall package most suited to their individual circumstances. 
The Commission will further examine this issue in the light of the reactions to this 
working paper. 
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1.  Introduction 
Aside from the issues indicated above, a number of potential constraints to f\.pther 
Res-electricity  generation  across  the  E.U.  have  been  identified  by  producers,  and 
•  brought to  the attention of the  Commission as  areas  in  which possible EU action 
might produce positive benefits. These areas, which will be further examined in the 
light of  comments received following publication of  this paper, are: 
2.  Administrative and planning procedures 
One major barrier to  the  further  development of RES  electricity  in the  EU  is  the 
'administrative and planning procedures that potential generators must meet. This has 
been highlighted by a nuinber of  representative organisations responsible for differing 
RES producers. 
Articles  4-6  of the  Electricity  Directive  provide  the  basic  rules  in  this  respect, 
providing notably that where an authorisation procedure is followed, the rules must be 
objective and non-discriminatory.  However, it should be noted that these rules, often 
developed for both large generation projects and small RES  projects alike, place a 
significant burden on RES  producers  given their smaller size,  both overall  and in 
terms  of average  generation site.  In  these  circumstances,  an,P  given  the  need  to 
encourage  the  opportunities  for  RES  producers  to  produce  throughout  the  EU, 
harmonisation in this area would be likely to produce significant benefits. However, 
there would also be  a number of disadvantages to such an approach.  The planning 
procedures  vary  significantly  from  Member State to  Member State,  and  take  into 
account the very different environmental, demographic, and federal structures across 
the Community. 
In  such  circumstances,  and  with  due  regard  to  subsidiarity,  it  does  not  appear 
appropriate at present to adopt specific harmonisation in this area.  An effort to make 
progress in this area might well nonetheless be contemplated. One might envisage, in 
this respect, agreeing that all Member States: 
(i)  review  the  existing  measures,  planning  and  administrative,  that  potential  RES 
producers must meet, to determine which action, if any, can be taken to reduce the 
regulatory barriers to increasing RES production such as (a) the setting up of a single 
reception point for authorisation applications (b) ensuring co-ordination between the 
different administrative bodies involved and the establishment of  reasonable deadlines 
(c) the establishment of a "fast-track" planning procedure for RES producers, (d) the 
possibility of establishing mechanisms under which the absence of a decision by the 
competent bodies on an application for authorisation within a certain period of time 
automatically  results  in  an  authorisation,  (e)  the  production  of specific  planning 
guidelines for RES projects, (f) the establishment, at national, regional or local level, 
of development  plans  indicating  sites  suitable  for  establishing  new  capacity  for 
generating RES  electricity and (g)  the  introduction of training programmes for  the 
32 personnel responsible for the authorisation procedures, and (ii) to publish a report in 
this respect, outlining the conclusions reached as to what action, is to be taken. 
3.  Grid connection and reinforcement issues 
Renewable electricity (RES-E) generators wishing to feed electricity into the grid have 
to  be  connected,  which  may  require  expensive  installations,  especially  for  wind 
electricity, which are  often located in areas remote from  the grid.  Connection costs 
may thus considerably increase the investment costs and inhibit the development of 
installations.  This  is  particularly  the  case,  due  to  the  small  size  of renewable 
generators: the connection costs represent a significantly larger part of  the total per site 
investment for a RES-E installation than for a conventional plant. 
In addition, as new generators are connected, strengthening of  the grid, i.e. installation 
of  new or upgraded power lines may be necessary. The question of  who has to pay for 
these  grid-strengthening  investments  may  affect  the  rate  of uptake  of RES-E  in 
general. 
On the other hand, the connection of a new generator can have benefits for the grid 
system;  if connected  at  the  appropriate  part  of the  system,  a  new  generator  can 
reinforce the grid system by its mere existence and would thus stretch or assist the 
network.  Consequently,  reinforcements  intended  by  the  grid-operator  become 
unnecessary or can be postponed. 
To  function properly, an internal market in electricity would have to provide a level 
playing field for all existing and potential producers of electricity. This requires that 
charges put on renewable  generators related to the grid-system correctly reflect the 
economic costs and  benefits associated with  the  connection,  in order to avoid that 
connection and grid-system costs become unfairly prohibitive. 
It should be noted that the Electricity Directive in Article 7(2) provides for Member 
States  to  ensure  that  technical  rules  and  operational  requirements  concerning  the 
connection of generators to  the transmission grid are developed in an objective and 
non-discriminatory  manner  and  are  published.  However,  a  comparable  provision 
regarding the distribution system does not exist. 
It has been suggested, notably by some representatives of renewables producers, that 
as a general rule, connection costs of  renewable generators should be borne by the grid 
operator,  to  facilitate  deployment  of RES  installations.  It  is  doubtful,  however, 
whether  this  approach  can  be  considered  appropriate.  In  fact,  it  would  lead  to  a 
situation where the distance to the grid would be irrelevant to potential investors. Such 
an  approach would thus  encourage  non-economic  installations.  On  the  contrary,  to 
ensure the correct development of the RES sector in the EU, it is important that all 
relevant investments are fully taken into account, including grid connection costs. 
It does not seem appropriate to  set mandatory rules on cost sharing with regard to 
connection  and  other grid  system  costs at  the  European  level.  However,  measures 
33 might be appropriate to ensure that the rules at Member State level comply with some 
general and common EU - wide principles: 
the  full  costs  and  benefits  associated  with  the  connection of a  new RES-
installation should be made transparent ; 
future benefits to the grid  .. system, such as avoided or postponed reinforcement, 
should be taken into account ; 
there  should  be  rules  foreseeing  compensation  payments  if  subsequent 
electricity  consumers  connecting  to  the  grid  benefit  from  a  grid  asset 
(  connection.or Strengthening)- associated with and paid for by a first consumer 
connecting to the grid. 
As regards the benefits RES-electricity installations can provide to the grid system in 
terms of  avoided system losses, it might be appropriate to require that Member States 
ensure that these benefits are fully reflected in the relevant tariff  systems. 
34 V.  CONCLUSION 
The objective of  this paper has been to highlight the numerous options available to the 
Community in addressing the issue of renewable sourced electricity generation and 
the  interrial  market  for  renewable-generated  electricity.  As  ean be  seen  from  the 
above, these options can be divided into two main issues. First, is Community action 
in the form of  a Directive or other initiative necessary to meet the EU's objectives in 
this area? Second, if so, what approach would be appropriate? In the light of the 
comments  received  on the  basis  of this  paper,  the  Commission  intends. to  reach 
conclusions  on these  issues as  soon  as  practicable,- and,  if necessary,  to present 
appropriate proposals. 
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Wind Power Installed Capacity (MW) 
1990  1992  1995  1997 
--
Austria  0  0  1  20 
Belgium  5  4  4  5 
·Denmark  343  458  617  1111 
Finland  0  1  6  12 
France  0  1  3  9 
Germany  48  183  1137  1966 
Greece  2  17  27  28 
Ireland  0  7  7  so 
Italy  3  7  22  99 
Luxembourg  0  0  0  3 
Netherlands  51  109  257  330 
Portugal  1  3  8  29 
Spain  7  46  115  455 
Sweden  7  20  67  122 
UK  10  so  200  322 
TotaiEU  483  905  2471  4661 
Sources: Eurostat, EWEA, and BTM Consult 
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Eleetricity generated from Res in °k of total eleetric:ity c:onsumption 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Total 
Source: Eurostat 
n.a. = non available 
Res electricity in % of total consumption 
incl. Large hydro  excl. Large hydro 
1990  1994  1996  1997  1990  1994  1996 
62.8  70.6  66.0  n.a.  n.a  9.0  8.7 
1 .2  1 .1  1 .1  1 .0  n.a  0.9  0.9 
2.4  5.6  6.3  n.a.  2.4  5.6  6.3 
24.0  25.0  24.1  n.a.  8.8  10.2  9.2 
14.8  19.3  15.5  n.a.  1 .7  2.4  2.2 
4.9  4.5  4.4  4.5  n.a  2.2  2.3 
5.0  6.5  10.0  8.6  0.2  0.3  0.4 
4.8  5.1  4.0  n.a~  n.a  0.7  1 .1 
13.9  18.0  16.5  16.0  3.7  4.7  4.7 
2.1  2.4  1 .6  n.a.  2.1  2.4  1 .6 
1 .4  2.0  2.8  3.5  1 .4  2.0  2.8 
35.0  36.2  44.6  n.a.  3.3  4.8  4.7 
16.9  15.5  23.8  n.a.  n.a  2.6  4.0 
51  .4  42.9  38.2  n.a.  n.a  4.1  5.3 
1 .8  2.1  1 .6  1 .7  n.a  n.a  0.7 
13.5  14.4  13.5  n.a.  n.a  n.a  3.0 
38 
1997 
n.a. 
0.9 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
2.4 
0.4 
n.a. 
4.5 
n.a. 
3.5 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
0.9 
n.a. Annex III 
Prices paid for Res electricity in Member States 
1  Germany 
In the German feed in law, the price paid to RES-E generators is linked to the average 
revenue from power supply to the end consumer, excluding VAT. PV and wind get 
the highest payment, which  is 90%. The following table shows the price per kWh 
paid to independent wind power producers since the introduction of the· scheme.  In 
law  entered  into  force  on  1  January  1991.  The  price  in  1998  constitutes  16.79 
German Pfennig per kWh or € 0.086 per kWh). 
Year  Price in 
Pfennig 
1991  16.61 
1992  16.53 
1993  16.57 
1994  16.93 
1995  17.28 
1996  17.21 
1997  17.15 
1998  16.79 
Source: Eurosolar, Member State information 
2  Denmark 
In Denmark, the price for electricity to independent wind power producers constitutes 
85% of the net price of a consumer of more than 20,000 kWh per year minus costs for 
using the grid. The price paid depends on the area and varies between 0.25 - 0.39 
DKK per kWh. The average price approximates  0.39 DKK per kWh. On top of this is 
a subsidy of 0.10 DKK per kWh (reimbursement of the C02 tax which is levied on all 
electricity, including electricity from carbon free fuels) and a further subsidy of 0.17 
DKK per kWh. Thus the total payment to the wind power producer constitutes 0.53 -
0.66 DKK per kWh (€ 0.0697 - €  0.0885 per kWh) and in average 0.59 DKK per 
kWh (€ 0.079 per kWh). The price range has remained stable over the last years due 
to stable electricity prices. 
3  Spain 
Under the  feed-in  regulation  in  Spain  RES-E was  sold to the  grid in  1997  at  the 
following prices: 
Small hydro: 
Wind: 
1  1.37 PSE (€ 0.068) 
11.48 PSE (€ 0.068) 
(Source: Member State information) 
39 4  United Kingdom 
Under the four NFFO tenders organised in 1990, 1991, 1994 and 1997 prices of RES-
E have developed as seen from the  following table (prices per kw/h): 
1990 (NFF0-1) 
1991 (NFF0-2) 
1994 (NFF0-3) 
1997 (NFF0-4) 
Average price wind 
10.0p 
11.0o 
4.8p12 
3.53p
13 (€ 0.05) 
Average price all technologies 
7.0p 
7.2p 
4.35p 
3.46p (€ 0.049) 
-;Source: Renewable Energy Bulletin No 7, Department of Trade & Industry, 25 November 1997 
5  Other Member states (most recent data) 
Italy: between  € 0.083 and € 0.1 54, depending on technology; after 8 years prices are 
reduced to € 0.053 for all technologies 
France: 0.337 FF (€ 0.056) 
Netherlands: 0.08 G (€ 0.036) 
·Belgium: 2.1 BEF (€ 0.052) 
Portugal: 10.8 ESC (€ 0.053) 
Source: Member States information 
3.1.6  Summary table on current prices paid 
To illustrate the situation a potential new investor would face with regard to prices in 
the above mentioned Member States, the following table gives an overview on current 
prices per kW/h (in €, based on most recent data): 
D  DK  E  UK  I  F  NL  B  p 
€  0.086  0.079  0.068  0.049  0.083  0.056  0.036  0.052  0.053 
12 for investments in wind power capacity above 1.6 MW 
13 for investments in wind power capacity above 0.768 MW 
40 Annex IV:  Renewable Energy R&D Expenditure by Country : 1995 (SUS million)!! 
Solar  Total 
Hydro  Geothermal  Biomass  Wind  SolarH&C  Solar PV  Thermal  Other  Renewable 
Electric 
Austria  n/a  N/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Belgium  0.1  0.0  2.5  0.2  0.9  1.2  0.0  0.0  4.9 
Denmark  0.0  0.0  8.9  7.0  2.3  0.2  0.0  0.2  18.6 
Finland  n/a  N/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
France  0.1  1.3  2.0  0.2  0.3  2.2  0.0  0.0  6.1 
Germany  0.0  2.6  2.1  27.2  19.4  40.4  4.6  0.0  96.2 
Greece  n/a  N/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  nla  n/a 
Ireland  n/a  N/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  nla  n/a  nla 
Italy  0.0  0.0  9.8  10.1  0.0  22.2  0.0  0.0  42.0 
Luxembourg  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Netherlands  0.1  0.1  1.9  6.9  1.8  9.4  0.1  0.0  20.3 
Portugal  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.6 
Spain  0.0  0.0  14.2  33.0  1.3  8.7  8.4  0.0  65.6 
Sweden  0.1  0.1  10.3  2.0  1.5  0.4  0.0  0.0  14.4 
United Kingdom  0.2  0.0  5.1  5.0  2.8  0.7  0.0  0.4  14.3 
TotalEU  0.6  4.1  59.2  91.0  30.3  85,5  13,0  0,6  283 
Australia  n/a  N/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  nla  nla  nla  nla 
Canada  0.8  0.1  5.6  1.1  2.0  1.5  0.0  0.0  11.0 
Japan  0.0  40.9  6.2.  6.7  3.6  80.4  0.0  1.5  139.4 
New Zealand  0.0  0.9  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.1 
Norway  2.7  0.0  0.9  0.4  0.7  0.1  0.0  0.3  4.9 
Switzerland  4.8  2.6  8.5  0.8  11.4  9.8  6.7  0.0  45.0 
Turkey  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4 
United States  4.9  37.8  59.6  47.1  93.7  87.5  31.5  0.0  393.0• 
Total reported  13.8  86.5  138.1  147.7  142.3  264.8  51.2  2.4  877.7* 
Source: lEA Energy Technology R&D Statistics, 1974-1995, IEA/OECD 1997. 
14 'Renewable Energy Policy in lEA Countries, Volume 1: Overview.lntemational Energy Agency, 1997, p.29 
• Total renewable energy includes US$ 30.9 million in 1995 for policy and management support, program support, resource assessment and other cross-cutting support elements which has 
not been allocated to the sub-categories.  41 AnnexV:  Support of  RES electricity outlide the European Union 
Below,  some  information on  how  RES  electricity  is  supported  outside  the  EU  is 
given. 
United States 
Electricity from  RES  represented  11.9% of total  electricity generation  in  1996, of 
which 2.3% came from non hydro sources. 
Since  1978,  non utility producers of RES-E have been supported through PURP  A 
(Public Utility Regulatory  Policies  Act)  which obliged  utilities to purchase power 
from RES facilities and co-generators at the avoided costs of  the utility. However, as a 
part of  the plan to liberalise the electricity market, it has been proposed by the Clinton 
administration to replace PURP  A by a RPS  (Renewable Portfolio Standard) which 
requires  electricity  sellers  to  cover  a  percentage  of their  electricity  sales  with 
generation  from  non-hydroelectric  technologies.  Retail  sellers  could  meet  the 
requirement by generating sufficient renewable electricity themselves, by purchasing 
tradable renewable electricity credits (RECs) from producers generating more than the 
requirement or by a combination of  own production and the purchase of  RECs. 
The reason for this change is  that (i) a purchase obligation as the PURP  A is seen 
unreasonable  in  a  market  without  captive  customers,  (ii)  the  RPS  is  based  on 
competition between RES  producers and spreads the costs  more  evenly across  the 
market,  and  (iii)  it  avoids  the  troublesome  regulatory  determinations  regarding 
avoided costs. 
The RPS requirement would initially be set close to the present ratio of RPS-eligible 
generation but with a projected requirement of  5.5% in 2010. Existing contracts under 
PURP  A would be allowed to continue under the current regulation in order to ease the 
transition to the competition based system
15
• 
Furthermore,  tax incentives are  applied  for .the  promotion of new RES-E.  A  10% 
investment credit is given for most solar technologies and geothermal, a production 
tax credit  supports wind and biomass, and a production incentive credit is awarded to 
facilities which cannot exploit the tax credit as they do not pay federal taxes. Finally 
R&D  is_ supported  via  various  programmes  administrated  by  the  Department  of 
Energy
16
• 
Japan 
Electricity  from  RES  represented  8.0%  of total  electricity  generation  in  1996,  of 
which 2.4% came from non hydro sources. 
15 See below, section Ill 3.1.~  .• transitional regimes. 
16 See table  1, in annex. 
42  43 Increased use of  RES is seen as an indispensable instrument to meet the C02 target of 
stabilising the emissions at their 1990 level by 2000. Japan has set non-binding targets 
for RES penetration as fc;>llows: 
hydro power should increase to 45500 MW in 2000 and to  57000 MW in 
2010; 
geothermal installed capacity should increase to 600 MW in 2000 and to 2800 
MWin2010; 
PV capacity should increase to 400 MW in 2000 and to 4600 MW in 201 0; 
wind power should increase to 20 MW in 2000 and to 150 MW in 2010; 
and waste should increase to 2000 MW in 2000 and 4000 MW in 2010. 
The Japanese government supports the construction of new RES  facilities  through 
subsidies (from 1  0% of  capital costs for hydro plants to 50% for some PV and wind 
installations).  Furthermore,  the  state  provides  tax  incentives  through  reduction  in 
income  taxes  or  depreciation  allowances  and  through  low  interest  loans  or 
reimbursement of  part of  the interest payments. 
In addition to financial incentives, fixed prices for PV and wind power have been set 
equal  to  end-consumer  prices.  However,  there  is  no  guaranteed  market  and  the 
production of electricity from these sources is very limited (2 GWh of the total non 
hydro RES production 23949 GWh in 1996). 
Norway 
Close to  100% of the  electricity production  in Norway  is  based on hydro  power 
(nearly all production stems from hydro power plants larger than 10 MW). It is an 
objective that new RES  technologies, i.e.  bio energy, wind energy and solar energy 
should increase in importance. 
The state supports R&D in new RES technologies and introduction and demonstration 
projects,  especially  in  new  technologies.  From  January  1999  exemption  for 
investment taxes (7%) will be given for investments in bio energy, wind energy, heat 
pumps,  district  heating,  wave  power  and  for · mini  hydro  plants  (  <  1  MW). 
Furthermore,  a  subsidy  is  given  to  wind  power,  corresponding  to  50%  of the 
electricity tax. 
44 ANNEX VI 
Details on the investigations and consultations made 
Subsequent  to  the  White  Paper  on  RES  and  the  Harmonisation  Report  the 
Commission has analysed in detail the situation with regard to RES-E in the European 
Union. Existing studies and reports" on the design and functioning of current support 
mechanisms  as  well  as  on  barriers  other  than  financial,  such  as  administrative 
procedures and grid-system issues, were. consulted. 
Furthennore,  valuable infonnation was received from Member States, on the basis of 
a questionnaire sent up by the Commission. 
Apart from the above investigations, discussions were held and/or comments received 
on the issue from many interested parties, such as: 
- Energy Consultative Committee (comprising representatives of  the RES  sectors, 
the  electricity  industry,  environmental  organisations,  trade  unions,  employers, 
consumers etc.) 
- European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) 
- European Biomass Association (AEBIOM) 
- European Small Hydropower Association (ESHA) 
- European Photovoltaic Industry Association (EPIA) 
- EURELECTRIC 
- European Utilities for Renewable Energies (EURE) 
- Bundesverband Windenergie (BWE, Gennan national wind association) 
- Representatives of  individual companies, from the RES sector and from traditional 
energies 
- Greenpeace 
- IFIEC (large industrial electricity consumers) 
-Members of  national parliaments and members of  the EP  involved in energy matters 
In the following the views expressed are summarised briefly: 
17  Examples of  studies and reports used:  -IEA: Renewable Energy Policy in  lEA Countries, (June 
1998); E.D.  CROSS (Institute of  Energy Law,  Leiden):  Legal frameworks  for the promotion of wind 
energy and other renewable energy resources in the EU Member States {1997); EUROSOLAR:  Legal, 
technical, administrative and structural conditions for Common Feed-In Rules in the EU for electricity 
generated  with  renewable  energy  sources  (RES)  by  auto-producers  {March  1996,  APAS  study 
commissioned by DO  XII); ILEXIRAMBOLL:  European  Union  Member States connection and use of 
system  policies  for  renewable  generators  {October  1996,  ALTENER  study);  C.  MITCHELL:  {co-
ordinator): The value of renewable electricity {final draft April  1998, JOULE study commissioned by 
DO  XII);  C.  MITCHELL:  Renewable  Energy  in  the  UK  {February  1998);  UK  DEPARTMENT OF 
TRADE  &:  INDUSTRY:  Renewable  Energy  Bulletin  No  7  (2S  November  1997);  FORUM  FOR 
ZUKUNFTSENERGIEN:  Aktionsprograrnm  Abbau  von  Hemmnissen  bei  der  Realisierung  von 
Anlagen Emeuerbarer Energien
17 {Aprill997) 
45 The Energy Consultative Committee gave an opinion on the issue, following intense 
discussions on the basis of  a catalogue of key questions submitted to the Committee 
by the Commission. 
From the bilateral contacts with representatives of  the RES sector, it became clear that 
the sector considers European legislation in the field of RES-E highly necessary in 
order to  ensure .that under the new framework conditions of the Internal Electricity 
Market the  RES-E  sector can further  develop.  However,  some,  in particular from 
Member States operating currently feed-in-laws, have expressed concerns about the 
idea  of replacing  such  feed-in-laws  by  alternative  mechanisms  in  the  future.  All 
representatives stresSed that apart from the financial question, other barriers, such as 
planning  procedures  and  grid-system  issues,  still  persist  and  hinder  RES-E 
development. 
The traditional  electricity industry is  generally favourable  to the idea of common 
Community rules on RES-E. They have emphasised that any rules must be designed 
in such a way that they ensure swplus costs incurred by the promotion of  RES-E to be 
as  low  as  possible  and  that equal  burden sharing  exists,  in order  to  avoid  trade 
distortions. 
From  other  players,  such  as  energy  expert  parliamentarians  non-governmental 
organisation  concerned  etc,  a  wide  range  of views  was  received.  The  most 
controversial point is the question on whether and how long existing feed-in-systems 
can  persist  in  the  Internal  Electricity  Market,  on  which  there  seems  to  be  no 
agreement.  The  need  for  some  kind  of EU  harmonisation  is,  however,  generally 
recognised. 
Finally, it should be noted that a number of additional studies on the issues are either 
ongoing or have been commissioned under the  1998 AL  TENER call. The results of 
these studies are expected to  provide helpful additional findings on the way forward. 
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